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Teaching the Fourteenth Amendment brings its own unique challenges, 
particularly when it comes to hot-button topics like abortion and same-sex 
marriage. Like many others, my institution is home to students who differ from 
one another in almost every way imaginable. It is no surprise that class 
discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment produce more disagreement than 
consensus. 
Political diversity is nothing new, but this generation of students has lived 
through an increasingly partisan political climate.1 Consensus about the scope 
of free speech on campus has broken down.2 This makes it harder for students 
to speak out in class, particularly when they are uncertain of their classmates’ 
opinions. Saying the wrong thing about a Fourteenth Amendment topic seems 
embarrassing at best and at worst, damaging to a student’s social standing. 
Increasingly, my students also have trouble separating law from politics. 
Unlike their predecessors, this generation of students has never known a world 
before the Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork.3 Many take for granted 
 
* Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at the Florida State University College of 
Law. I give special thanks to my students for their input on this draft. 
 1. On growing political polarization, see, for example, Russell Berman, What’s the Solution 
to Political Polarization in the U.S.?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/poli 
tics/archive/2016/03/whats-the-answer-to-political-polarization/470163 [https://perma.cc/6BX6- 
HLFN]; Jonathon Haidt & Marc Hetherington, Look How Far We Have Come Apart, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 17, 2012, 9:48 PM), https://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/look-how-far-
weve-come-apart [https://perma.cc/7VMJ-DNE6]. 
 2. See Matt Saincome, Berkley Riots: How Free Speech Debate Launched Violent Campus 
Showdown, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/berke 
ley-riots-inside-the-campus-showdown-over-free-speech-w465151 [https://perma.cc/Q66Q-HM 
S7]; Paige St. John & Shelby Grad, Ann Coulter, Free Speech, and UC Berkeley: How a Talk 
Became a Political Bombshell, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017, 7:45 AM), http://www.latimes.com/lo 
cal/lanow/la-me-coulter-speech-berkeley-20170425-story.html. 
 3. On the transformational impact of Bork’s failed nomination, see, for example, LAUREN 
COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF 
SENATE CONFIRMATION 101 (2002); CHRISTINE L. NEMACHEK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: 
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that presidential candidates will vow to nominate judges with specific views of 
Fourteenth Amendment issues.4 Accusations that judges engage in judicial 
activism—in politics, rather than law—are commonplace.5  
When a law school class takes on a divisive political issue, it is hard for 
students to stay away from the political claims on a specific subject—or even to 
know when they have crossed the line between constitutional law and popular 
debate. This matters for several reasons. Students have trouble mastering the ins 
and outs of constitutional law when they focus too much on entrenched political 
debate about a subject. And when students mix up law and popular politics, it 
can be hard to explain the relationship between legal and ideological arguments. 
Political arguments can and have reshaped formal constitutional law,6 but 
understanding this requires students to differentiate popular from formal 
constitutionalism in the first place.  
The blurring of law and politics happens partly because for this generation 
of students, the dominant constitutional conflicts of the day seem oddly removed 
from historical context. Some subjects, like abortion rights (and the validity of 
Roe v. Wade),7 seem to be a subject of permanent and bitter contestation.8 Other 
battles, like the struggle for same-sex marriage, might appear to be completely 
resolved.9 Because students do not always have a sense of the longer story 
 
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH 
GEORGE W. BUSH 47 (2007). 
 4. On the relevance of Supreme Court nominations in recent presidential elections, see Nina 
Totenberg, The Supreme Court: A Winning Issue in the Presidential Campaign?, NPR (Sept. 29, 
2016, 4:53 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/29/495960902/the-supreme-court-a-winning-issue-
in-the-presidential-campaign. 
 5. See, e.g., Jay Skoning, Gay Rights and Judicial Activism: Brazen End Run Around 
Congress, AM. SPECTATOR (Apr. 12, 2017, 12:04 AM), https://spectator.org/gay-rights-and-
judicial-activism-brazen-end-run-on-congress [https://perma.cc/93MZ-SYTF] (characterizing a 
Seventh Circuit ruling as “judicial legislation”); Ed Whelan, This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism, 
NAT’L REV. (Sept. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/446819/lib 
eral-judicial-activism [https://perma.cc/YJ6Y-P88V] (asserting that Justice Souter implemented 
the Left’s agenda on a broad range of issues). 
 6. For discussion of the impact of popular arguments on constitutional law, see, for example, 
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 7 (2004); Christopher W. Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the Right: Lessons from 
the Tea Party, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 523, 550–52 (2011); Reva Siegel & Robert Post, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373–77 (2007). 
 7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 8. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH 
CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 295–320 (Univ. Ill. Press 3d ed. 2002) (1976); LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 7 (1990). 
 9. See, e.g., Kathleen E. Hull, The Past and Future of (Same-Sex) Marriage, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 28, 2015, 5:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kathleen-e-hull/the-past-and-fu 
ture-of-same-sex-marriage_b_7681478.html [https://perma.cc/9TAA-ZR2H]. 
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behind some of the issues we study, any understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment issues we survey can be quite shallow. 
In this Essay, I explore ideas for navigating the hardest parts of teaching the 
Fourteenth Amendment at a time when partisanship and polarization have 
become so pronounced. Specifically, I discuss ways to overcome the following 
challenges: 1) student discomfort with staking out a position on controversial 
subjects; 2) students’ tendency to blur the law and politics surrounding 
Fourteenth Amendment topics; and 3) students’ blindness to the legal and 
political history shaping the doctrine we study. I consider ways to deal with these 
stumbling blocks in three separate parts. 
I.  OVERCOMING SILENCE 
I have often experienced uncomfortable silences when teaching the 
Fourteenth Amendment. I teach the Fourteenth Amendment as part of my 
courses in constitutional law and family law, and both classes tend to generate 
passionate conversations. In family law, students argue about who got the raw 
end of a divorce and how to fairly value the contributions of homemaking 
spouses. In constitutional law, students clash about what the Establishment 
Clause says about holiday displays. Yet when it comes time to discuss divisive 
topics, students become oddly silent.  
Or maybe the silence is not so strange. At a large public university, students 
are certain to disagree deeply with friends and classmates about big Fourteenth 
Amendment topics. Professors may have profound convictions that do not line 
up with their students’. Saying the wrong thing can, quite literally, make a 
student an object of ridicule. Students have confided in me that they did not want 
to say something off-putting in front of classmates making decisions about law 
review or moot court or student government. Others have worried that holding 
the wrong opinion would put that grade in jeopardy. 
A willingness to engage is certainly important to any law school class, but 
students’ silence is particularly counterproductive when they are learning about 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In this area, with many Supreme Court decisions 
that are familiar to lay people, students are far more likely to have 
preconceptions about what a particular opinion says. It is easy to think that Roe 
discusses a right to choose or that Obergefell v. Hodges10 mentions marriage 
equality. When students are afraid to say something stupid or offensive, they 
tend to pay less attention to the material altogether, and the misconceptions 
carried into the course are often carried back out of it.  
Additionally, some Fourteenth Amendment doctrine is quite complex. 
Students often struggle with the tiers of scrutiny governing some equal 
 
 10. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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protection and due process cases.11 Others wrestle with how doctrinal outliers 
like the undue burden standard fit into the larger Fourteenth Amendment 
framework.12 It is hard to explain that rational basis review may not always be 
as deferential as the hornbooks suggest.13 Fourteenth Amendment doctrine is 
deceptively complex. Fear of embarrassment makes it harder for students to dive 
into the doctrinal details that they will have to master. 
To help students overcome their reluctance to speak on controversial topics, 
I go out of my way to dignify every political and doctrinal position on the topics 
we discuss. As importantly, I encourage students to expose the weaknesses of 
every claim, even ones that I find instinctually compelling. Some of these 
conversations focus on how to make effective Fourteenth Amendment 
arguments rather than on who is “right” politically. Focusing on strong advocacy 
rather than substance makes it easier to jump-start deeper conversations about 
the topics we tackle. 
I also use historical context to show students how often people on either side 
of a Fourteenth Amendment topic have changed their minds. When it comes to 
abortion, for example, pro-life constitutionalists once favored a substantive due 
process method that would lead to the recognition of a fundamental right to 
life.14 Now, many of the same theorists call for an originalist method of 
interpretation.15 Seeing that people with whom a student agrees have changed 
makes it easier to invite open-mindedness from everyone in class. 
Finally, I use humor to break the ice. Students often approach certain topics 
with trepidation. In office hours, students have asked me whether I am nervous 
about an upcoming class on Roe or Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
 
 11. See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic 
Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (asserting the 
Court’s tiers of scrutiny are inconsistently applied and stating there is “little guidance” on when to 
defer to legislative facts); McClean Crichton, A Fool’s Errand: Why Congress Should Amend the 
Voting Rights Act but Not Section Four’s Coverage Formula, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 223, 230 (2014) 
(explaining that the Court oscillates between a rational basis test and heightened scrutiny); Suzanne 
B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 482–85 (2004) (discussing the 
Court’s lack of uniform application of its three-tiered equal protection framework and the problems 
with the three-tiered approach). 
 12. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortion, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 
1176, 1190–92 (2014) (describing abortion exceptionalism as courts’ failure to apply “normal 
doctrine” when abortion is at issue); Ian Vandelwalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How 
Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 2–3 
(2012). 
 13. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis 
Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 529–30 (2014). 
 14. See, e.g., MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 
42–54 (2015). 
 15. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 869–
75 (2014). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] NAVIGATING CONTROVERSIAL FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TOPICS 693 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.16 Abortion, like many Fourteenth Amendment subjects, 
is serious business, and I always try to treat students’ positions with respect and 
care. But occasionally, when class turns to a sensitive subject, I make fun of 
myself. I try to illuminate what might be funny about a particularly juicy 
sentence in a majority or dissenting opinion. When students can laugh, the stakes 
of saying something in class seem lower, and more students seem willing to 
share their thoughts.  
In smaller classes, I have also asked students to write response papers on the 
readings assigned on a controversial subject. This way, I have at least a sense of 
what students think before class starts. I can spark a conversation by asking 
members of the class about what they wrote. I can ask people to pinpoint the 
shortcomings of their own arguments and to take seriously the claims made by 
people who disagree. When it is feasible to do so, I try to get students to stake 
out a position before class to encourage more dialogue in class. 
What I have found, perhaps ironically, is that the more students talk about 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the more they are comfortable talking about the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Seminars tend to get the most deeply into touchy issues, 
and students have taken radically different positions on every subject we discuss. 
But generally, the more we dig into tough issues, the more at ease students tend 
to feel. Most students defy straightforward stereotypes. “Conservative” students 
do not take consistently “conservative” positions. Something similar is true of 
“progressive” students. 
If you know and speak extensively with someone who disagrees with you, 
you can dispel the myths surrounding what “that kind of person” is like. And 
while students may never change their minds, they always get a richer sense of 
how complex an issue is. 
II.  SEPARATING LAW FROM POLITICS 
The Fourteenth Amendment has given rise to some of the most politicized 
debates in constitutional law. Some historians believe that Dred Scott v. 
Sanford17 set off the Civil War.18 The abortion rights recognized in Roe and 
Casey might have made the difference in some presidential elections.19 
Fourteenth Amendment issues spark protests, boycotts, marches, and television 
advertisements.  
Because of all of this, it is easy for students to mix up familiar political 
claims with what I teach about the Fourteenth Amendment. When we cover Roe, 
 
 16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality decision). 
 17. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 18. See, e.g., ROBERT K. CARR, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 208 (1942); 
Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and The Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 97, 98 (2007). 
 19. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, It’s Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Election, 
57 J. POL. 176, 176–86 (1995). 
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students often continue to attribute ideas to the decision that the Supreme Court 
did not articulate in 1973. Something similar happens when we talk about Brown 
v. Board of Education.20 Other students have trouble staying on topic, treating 
constitutional arguments almost like a distraction from the political arguments 
that they find persuasive. 
Failing to separate law from politics can create headaches for students as 
well as for me. First, students sometimes miss the practical side of learning 
constitutional law. Fourteenth Amendment issues can come up in a surprising 
variety of cases—in contexts from zoning21 to child support22 to small-business 
regulations.23 If students continue to view these issues through the lens of 
politics, they may leave my class without any of the practical tools that I hope 
to give them. 
When students get swept away by political arguments, they also miss the 
impact that arguments made outside of court have had on the doctrine we study. 
In recent years, legal scholars and historians have created a valuable literature 
on how constitutional law is not always shaped by the usual suspects.24 Clients, 
rather than lawyers, can dictate claims made before courts.25 Social movement 
activists, regulators, legislators, and other actors articulate ideas about the 
Fourteenth Amendment that influence what the courts say and do.26 It is hard to 
teach about popular constitutionalism when students fail to grasp the differences 
between legal doctrine and political ideas.  
I use several techniques to help students see the difference between familiar 
political arguments and potentially unfamiliar Fourteenth Amendment doctrinal 
approaches. First, in giving students historical background on the subjects we 
discuss, I explicitly discuss political conflicts about the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This discussion helps students to see the evolution of independent but 
intertwined debates about the Fourteenth Amendment in politics. These 
conversations also help students to feel that their political convictions are not 
being dismissed.  
I also take opportunities to incorporate popular constitutionalism into our 
discussion of case law. When we discuss the Equal Protection Clause, we also 
 
 20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495–96 (1977). 
 22. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375–77 (1978). 
 23. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477–78 (1989). 
 24. See, e.g., Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312, 2319–24 (2012). 
 25. See, e.g., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); GEORGE I. 
LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS (2012). 
 26. See, e.g., TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 213–15 (2011); SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE 
CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 2–5 (2014); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or 
Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 191–215 
(2008). 
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talk about Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, exploring the relationship between 
the two and the elaboration of constitutional law outside the courts.27 We talk 
about popular reinterpretations of Roe.28 When we study Casey, we spend time 
on the Justices’ views of both popular abortion politics and their influence on 
abortion doctrine.29 This kind of class allows students to see both the relevance 
of public discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment and the difference between 
popular views and formal doctrine.  
Applying case law to real-world cases can also bring students back to the 
legal side of the Fourteenth Amendment. Recently, I have had students discuss 
the constitutionality of President Trump’s travel ban.30 After reading Casey, we 
analyzed the constitutionality of laws banning abortion after twenty weeks31 or 
requiring women to receive information about the possibility of reversing the 
effects of medical abortion.32 When students see how Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine can apply to subjects they see in the news, they have more reason to 
tease out the differences between law and politics.  
When possible, I also tell the stories of specific litigants in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases. These individual narratives remind students that we are 
studying specific cases and controversies, not abstract political fights. These 
stories remind students of the real-world consequences faced by plaintiffs like 
Jim Obergefell33 or Abigail Fisher.34 Additionally, these narratives remind 
 
 27. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE 
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 32–74 (2010). 
 28. See ZIEGLER, supra note 14, at 159–86. 
 29. On the popular constitutionalism evident in the Casey decision, see Siegel & Post, supra 
note 6, at 426–29. 
 30. For analysis of the travel ban, see Int’l Refugees Ass’n v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. 
Md. 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
 31. For an overview of these laws, see State Policies on Later Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions 
[https://perma.cc/WCZ3-ETFD]. 
 32. See, e.g., Americans United for Life, Abortion Pill Reversal Information Act, MODEL 
LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE, Fall 2016, at 3, http://aul.org/downloads/2016-Legislative-Guides/ 
WPP/Abortion_Pill_Reversal_Information_Act_-_LG_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/973D-VYUY]. 
 33. See, e.g., Steven Petrow, Jim Obergefell: The ‘Accidental Activist’ One Year Later, WASH. 
POST (June 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/jim-obergefell-the-acciden 
tal-activist-one-year-later/2016/06/09/59d20992-2daa-11e6-9b37-42985f6a265c_story.html?utm 
_term=.5fe8a6d3f4ce; Michael S. Rosenwald, How Jim Obergefell Became the Face of the 




 34. See, e.g., Mollie Reilly, 5 Things to Know about the Woman Whose Case Could End 
Affirmative Action as We Know It, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.huff 
ingtonpost.com/entry/abigail-fisher-5-things-to-know_us_56719717e4b0dfd4bcc026a4 
[https://perma.cc/8WX8-MGR2]. 
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students of the limits of what the law, including the much-lauded Fourteenth 
Amendment, can deliver when it comes to social change. 
III.  REINTRODUCING HISTORY 
As a legal historian, I tend to see the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
foundational part of the nation’s political and legal evolution. When I was a 2L 
and first fell in love with legal history, my professor spent what was probably 
an inordinate amount of time on the Fourteenth Amendment. That approach 
made sense to me at the time, and nothing has changed since then. 
But with a few exceptions, students are not history nerds like me, and they 
often have little sense of how interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment have 
changed. Some of this is generational. My students generally were born when 
the civil rights movement was treated more as something that occurred in the 
past rather than a present-day struggle.35 Many of my classes have roughly equal 
numbers of men and women, reinforcing students’ views that we have largely 
eliminated discrimination on the basis of sex.36 Students may have the sense that 
the Fourteenth Amendment targets types of discrimination that occurred in the 
past and are no longer a concern. 
An obliviousness to history can make Fourteenth Amendment doctrine seem 
far more resistant to change than is really the case. Students will often ask if they 
“have to know” cases that no longer have precedential weight, like Plessy v. 
Ferguson,37 Lochner v. New York,38 or even Roe. Some assume that these 
decisions were obviously wrong at the time they were decided. Others conclude 
that a decision is irrelevant if the Court has overruled it in whole or in part. 
Dismissing this history makes it harder for students to see the ways in which 
lawyers and activists challenge and dislodge established precedent.  
Understanding the contingency of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine is 
important because so much of what I teach is still changing. In family law and 
constitutional law, for example, we discuss the rules governing assisted 
reproduction. To say that this area of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine is up in 
the air would be an understatement. Courts disagree about what body of law 
should apply to assisted reproduction cases and about how to apply it. Some 
judges apply a relatively familiar framework, like Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine governing abortion or parental rights.39 Other courts take assisted 
 
 35. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Teaching Employment Discrimination, 54 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 755, 755–56 (2010). 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 757. 
 37. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 38. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 39. See, e.g., DMT v. TMH, 129 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2013); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn. 1992); L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 2013). 
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reproduction as an opportunity to ditch much-criticized doctrinal approaches and 
try something new.40  
It can be hard for students to understand what is going on in these cases 
when they treat current case law as a given. A better sense of the history shows 
how many familiar Fourteenth Amendment topics were once open-ended and 
easily could be once again. 
Without a good historical grounding, students have an oversimplified sense 
of the distinction between Fourteenth Amendment decisions that have been 
overruled and those that have not. Indeed, the Court has reinterpreted decisions 
to the point of transforming an original holding. Such was the case with Brown 
and Roe, just to name a few. To have a real grasp of Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine, students should understand how the Court modifies its precedents as 
well as rejects them.  
And missing the historical narrative can lead students to ignore the many 
paths not taken in the law of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is easy to think that 
the evolution of doctrine was natural in some ways, either the result of the 
meaning of the Constitution or the views of political leaders. The problem, of 
course, is that this view is as discouraging as it is wrong. Contemplating the lost 
possibilities of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine can remind students how 
different the law could have been and could be once again. Teaching these lost 
possibilities can also open students’ eyes to interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that differ considerably from the ones in the casebook. 
Finally, students’ lack of awareness about history can send an inaccurate 
message about where Fourteenth Amendment law is made. Casebooks often 
emphasize the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and with some reason. But 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine is shaped in many other places. The Supreme 
Court hears only a small fraction of the cases decided on Fourteenth Amendment 
issues,41 and for an extended time, crucial matters will be decided only by lower 
courts.  
Furthermore, the Court pays at least some attention to others’ ideas about 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Sometimes, this is obvious. When Justice Anthony 
Kennedy describes evolving ideas about the Fourteenth Amendment, for 
example, he looks to state laws, local ordinances, and lower court decisions.42 
Originalist Justices, like the late Justice Antonin Scalia, look beyond Supreme 
 
 40. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 
174 (N.Y. 1998). 
 41. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Case of the Plummeting Supreme Court Docket, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/us/29bar.html. 
 42. For discussion of Kennedy’s attention to state norms and evolving standards, see Lisa K. 
Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s Move Away from a 
Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 25, 47, 55 
(2007). 
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Court opinions for evidence of the founders’ intent.43 And on other occasions, 
the influence of others’ views of the Fourteenth Amendment may be as subtle as 
a fleeting reference to a lower court opinion or an influence that will only be 
clear later to those combing through a Justice’s papers at an archive. An 
understanding of the broader historical context of an opinion allows students to 
see the actors that can influence the Supreme Court. At times, these outside 
actors have had the final word on what the Fourteenth Amendment means.  
I try to introduce historical context in several ways. First, before we tackle 
the cases assigned for class, I give students historical background on the subject 
we are studying. I try to make this discussion easily digestible and relatable. 
Rather than assigning a lot of additional reading, I try to introduce ideas in class, 
so that students are less inclined to see history as an annoyance that expands 
their workload. 
I also introduce brief excerpts of briefs, statutes, lower court opinions, and 
other unconventional material that deals with the constitutional subjects we 
study. I ask students to think about where different ideas about the Fourteenth 
Amendment originate. I also invite students to identify how the opinions in the 
casebook differ in their ideas about the purpose, scope, and history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
When we encounter a discussion of history in a Supreme Court opinion, I 
also pause to ask students what difference it would make if the Justices got it 
wrong. Should we understand the history connected to the incorporation of the 
Second Amendment the way that the Justices did in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago?44 How different might debates about the Fourteenth Amendment look 
if the Court in the Slaughterhouse-Cases had taken a different position on the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause?45 Is the problem with Roe v. Wade Justice 
Harry Blackmun’s reading to the popular or medical history of abortion?46 
By asking these questions, I help students get a better sense of how we got 
where we are today when it comes to the Fourteenth Amendment. Some of my 
best professors taught me the same thing. When I was in law school learning 
about the Fourteenth Amendment, I ran into Buck v. Bell47 for the first time. 
Buck involved a compulsory sterilization law then on the books in Virginia.48 
Virginia wanted to sterilize Carrie Buck because state officials believed that she 
was “feeble-minded” and “promiscuous.”49 The basis for this ruling was 
 
 43. On Scalia’s approach to originalism, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
 44. 561 U.S. 742, 767–78 (2010). 
 45. 83 U.S. 36, 74–80 (1873). 
 46. 410 U.S. 113, 130–48 (1973). 
 47. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 48. Id. at 205–06. 
 49. PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 127 (2008). 
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Carrie’s illegitimate child.50 Buck argued, among other things, that the law 
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it ordered the compulsory 
sterilization only for the inmates of certain state institutions.51 
The story got more depressing from there. Only one Justice dissented from 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ decision rejecting Carrie Buck’s claim.52 It is 
horrific to justify sterilization because of a woman’s sexual history or disability, 
but Carrie Buck did not even resemble the description offered by the State of 
Virginia. Contemporaneous records have established that Carrie Buck did not 
have a low IQ.53 Nor was she promiscuous; her pregnancy resulted from rape.54 
My professor used history to bring Carrie Buck to life. He told us about the 
eugenic legal reform movement. We heard about compulsory sterilization laws 
and rules about who could marry. I was shocked that I had never heard of 
eugenic laws before. All of the things the professor discussed seemed so bizarre 
and awful, and yet all of them happened so recently.  
Constitutional case law on eugenics also made me less certain that I 
understood either the law or politics of reproduction. I found myself thinking 
about the relationship between the right to procreate and the right to avoid 
procreation, about the role of control in reproduction, and much more.  
I want my students to have similar experiences. I hope they can see how 
disturbingly or delightfully different the law of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
been and could be in the future. I hope they remember how real people are 
affected by our ideas about the Fourteenth Amendment all the time. If done 
correctly, incorporating history into the teaching of the Fourteenth Amendment 
allows me to do what T.S. Elliott described—to bring the class back to the place 
where we started and know it for the first time.55  
CONCLUSION 
Teaching the Fourteenth Amendment is one of the most fulfilling 
experiences that I have as a professor. Although teaching a divisive subject can 
be stressful, it can also be moving, thought-provoking, and fun. It is thought-
provoking when students offer me and each other ideas about the Constitution 
that we would never have encountered otherwise. It is fun to see students become 
committed to weaving the Fourteenth Amendment into the careers that they will 
pursue when law school is done. It is more than fun to see students encounter 
the possibilities and alien conclusions of constitutional doctrine in this area. And 
it is moving to see how much students can change their minds when they really 
 
 50. Id. at 134–37. 
 51. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205, 207–08. 
 52. Id. at 208 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
 53. See LOMBARDO, supra note 49, at 139. 
 54. Id. at 139–40. 
 55. T.S. ELLIOTT, FOUR QUARTETS 49–55 (1971). 
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understand another’s points of view. These are the reasons that teaching the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes me a better scholar and a better teacher—the 
same reasons why I would not give up teaching the subject for anything in the 
world. 
 
